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Introduction
On October 5, 1992, Congress passed the Cable Television Con-
sumer Protection and Competition Act1 (1992 Cable Act) by overrid-
ing a presidential veto, the only such occurrence during President
Bush's term of office. This followed years of vigorous battles among
warring interest groups, contending legislators, and crusading advo-
cacy groups. Yet the clamor of political battle was not matched by a
constitutional debate. With economics and politics the main topics,
freedom of speech was a side show.
Today, with a bit of distance, with electronic media converging,
and with the information superhighway a Washington buzzword, one
can resume the questioning. Is it constitutional under the First
Amendment to create regulations that restrict a communications me-
dium such as cable television? Looking at the 1992 Cable Act, one
can identify numerous free speech issues, including the following:
" Is there a constitutional asymmetry in the treatment of various
communications media?
" In what ways does new communications technology affect free
speech rights?
" Is it constitutional to mandate preferential access to a physical
transmission conduit by some content providers? Can one differ-
entiate between commercial and non-profit voices?
* What is the relationship between common carriage (mandated
non-discriminatory access) and free speech?
" Can owners of one medium be precluded from owning another?
" Is it constitutional to mandate the licensing of one firm's program
content by competing firms?
* Can a conduit be liable for content transmitted by it under legal
requirement?
" Can a multichannel conduit be required to segregate certain pro-
grams onto designated channels?
" Is it constitutional to require broadcasters to have their programs
distributed by cable operators without permission or
compensation?
* Is it constitutional to make the presence of effective competition
a condition for free speech?
" Can one require cable operators to prohibit certain programs
from access channels, to segregate adult programs onto a single
channel, and to make the operator liable for them?
1. Pub. L. No. 102-385, 106 Stat. 1460 (codified as amended at scattered sections of 47
U.S.C.) [hereinafter 1992 Cable Act].
2. 138 CONG. REC. S16,676 (daily ed. Oct. 5, 1992).
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To address these questions, the Columbia Institute for Tele-Infor-
mation (CITI) convened a group of noted scholars, each with a per-
spective of the 1992 Cable Act, and each an expert on speech,
communications law, or media economics. Their work was then dis-
cussed by noted practitioners, officials, and scholars.
CITI is a nonprofit research center at Columbia University. It
seeks to analyze and discuss issues of communications, economics,
law, and policy. CITI does not engage in consulting or proprietary
studies and takes seriously its independence from interest groups.
The project was funded by the following: CITI's general funds; the
Freedom Forum Foundation (formerly the Gannett Foundation, with
a major stake in the Gannett Company, the owner of newspapers,
broadcast stations, and advertising businesses); and Dr. Leonard Tow,
Chairman and CEO of the cable and telecommunications firms Cen-
tury Communications Corporation and Citizens Utilities, together
with his cable industry associates from the Entrepreneurs' Club. As
agreed from the outset, none of these parties other than CITI played
any role in the selection of the topics or authors.
The authors span a wide range of perspectives and conclusions.
They were not selected to represent any particular point of view, but
rather because of their outstanding reputations in the scholarship of
speech and communications. Regardless of the authors' views on any
part of the 1992 Cable Act, the reader will find these articles
provocative.
I
The 1992 Cable Act
The Cable Television Consumers Protection and Competition
Act is a response to the industry conditions that were encouraged by
an earlier major piece of legislation, the Cable Television Communica-
tion Policy Act of 1984.1 That law, passed at the height of the Reagan
years with bi-partisan support and shepherded through Congress by
the Telecommunications Subcommittee Chairman, Congressman
(soon Senator) Timothy Wirth of Colorado, substantially deregulated
the cable industry from price controls by local governments and
largely eliminated the threat of non-renewal of a franchise. Freed
from restrictions, the cable television industry developed after 1984
even faster than before. It increased channel capacity (to an average
3. 47 U.S.C. §§ 521-559 (1984).
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of thirty-seven in 19934), program diversity (there are over one hun-
dred satellite service channels5), reach (passing over ninety percent of
households), and customer base (sixty-three percent of television
households6). Yet cable television's very success also bore the seeds
of its subsequent reregulation. Cable's attractiveness raised demand
for it, while the high cost of upgrade and the debt repayment of ex-
pansion put pressure on the supply side. With only limited multichan-
nel competition, cable rates increased-according to Congress, three
times as fast as inflation. At the same time, the quality of service led
to many consumer complaints, but local governments across the coun-
try lacked regulatory powers to remedy the situation.
On the content side, cable's high penetration gave the cable in-
dustry increasing gatekeeper power over access to a viewer by a pro-
gram provider. They had the power to pick and choose program
channels and exclude those posing a threat to their own affiliated pro-
gram channels. Furthermore, they could deny popular program chan-
nels to competing delivery media such as direct satellite broadcasters,
microwave "wireless cable" operators, telephone companies, and al-
ternative cable systems. With over-the-air broadcasting channels re-
ceived increasingly over the cable wire and reception antennas
dismantled, television broadcasters were worried about not being car-
ried over cable or being placed on unfavorable spots on the dial.
As a consequence of these various concerns, a broad-based coali-
tion of consumer groups, broadcasters, municipalities, and other po-
tential competitive media formed and campaigned for reregulation.
Allied with the cable industry were the Hollywood studios, the White
House, and some deregulation-minded legislators.
In 1990, a regulatory bill passed the House but failed in the Sen-
ate. In 1991, the FCC, under Congressional pressure, adopted a
stricter definition of "effective competition." But for Congress it was
a matter of too little, too late. Soon, new bills were introduced by
Representative Edward Markey and Senators Ernest Hollings, Daniel
Inouye, and John Danforth.
At that point, the cable television industry could possibly have
averted large-scale regulation by supporting a real opening of mul-
tichannel television to much greater competition, substituting market
forces for regulation. But the cable industry, confident that a presi-
4. SUSAN TYLER EASTMAN, BROADCAST/CABLE PROGRAMMING: STRATEGIES AND
PRACTICES 246 (4th ed. 1993).
5. Id. at 247.
6. A.C. NIELSEN Co., NIELSEN REPORT ON TELEVISION (Feb. 1994), cited in NA-
TIONAL CABLE TELEVISION ASS'N, CABLE TELEVISION DEVELOPMENTS (Apr. 1994).
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dential veto would hold, as thirty-five previous Bush vetoes had, op-
posed both regulation and greater competition. It lost when rural and
moderate Republicans broke rank with President Bush and voted for
a regulatory bill. The vote was 74-25 in the Senate 7 and 308-114 in the
House.8
The sprawling new Act's major provisions sought, among others:
" To reimpose rate regulation by local governments on "basic tier"
cable service where a cable system is not subject to effective
competition;
" To allow broadcasters to demand payment by cable television op-
erators for "retransmission consent;"
" To adopt "must-carry" requirements, i.e. access rights of broad-
casters to the cable network without compensation;
* To require program channel suppliers affiliated with cable compa-
nies to license programming to competing distribution media;
* To require cable companies, depending upon system capacity and
concentration, to carry leased commercial access channels (sub-
ject to regulated rates and substitutable for minority and educa-
tional programming) and public access channels;
" To prohibit a cable operator from owning a satellite master an-
tenna television service or a multichannel multipoint distribution
service in the same franchise area; and
* To require leased and public access programs of an "adult" nature
to be segregated on a separate channel, available only to those
who request it in writing, with cable companies subject to poten-
tial liability for the programs.
H
The Issues
A major provision of the 1992 Cable Act is the "must-carry" obli-
gation under which cable operators are required to carry the over-the-
air broadcast signals available in their area. Within an hour of its en-
actment, the Turner Broadcasting Corporation challenged the provi-
sion in court.9 Within twenty-two months, the Supreme Court handed
down a decision.1 °
The Court's shaky 5-4 decision gave neither side a solid win.
There were five separate opinions, and the majority included the retir-
ing Justice Blackmun. Significantly, the must-carry provision re-
mained in place with the Court finding the rules to be content-neutral
7. 138 CONG. REC S16,676 (daily ed. Oct. 5, 1992).
8. 138 CONG. REC Hl1,487-88 (daily ed. Oct. 5, 1992).
9. Turner Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. FCC, No. 92-2247 (D.D.C. filed Oct. 5, 1992).
10. Turner Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 114 S. Ct. 2445 (1994), vacating and re-
manding 819 F. Supp. 32 (D.D.C. 1993), reh'g denied, 115 S. Ct. 30 (1994).
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and requiring an intermediate level of scrutiny." But the Court re-
manded the factual issue of harm to the broadcasters to the lower
courts. 2 The majority opinion, written by Justice Kennedy, concluded
that the must-carry rules were justified but that the lower court had
not adequately shown that broadcasting was "in genuine jeopardy and
in need of the protections afforded by must-carry," and, even with
such a showing, that must-carry "does not burden substantially more
speech than is necessary to further the government's legitimate inter-
ests."' 3 The majority found the law justified because of the "special
characteristics of the cable medium: the bottleneck monopoly power
exercised by cable operators and the dangers this power poses to the
viability of broadcast television." 4 In a dissenting opinion, Justice
O'Connor, joined by Scalia, Thomas, and Ginsburg, argued that the
rules were clearly content-based and thus called for a strict scrutiny
test of compelling state interest and no less drastic means. "[Mly con-
clusion that must-carry rules are content-based leads me to conclude
that they are an impermissible restraint on the cable operators' edito-
rial discretion as well as on the cable programmers' speech.' 5 More
generally, eight of the Justices concurred that cable operators should
have greater First Amendment rights than those of broadcasters but
not the same First Amendment protection as the print media.
Analyzing the must-carry question, Burt Neuborne, Professor of
Law at New York University and former Legal Director of the Ameri-
can Civil Liberties Union, argues in his article that one must uncouple
the constitutional issues of the actual speech from the conduit me-
dium, even if one is supportive of the vertical integration. He points
to the "symbiotic relationship" between speech and amplifying tech-
nologies that increase its potential audience. He concludes that the
conduit can be regulated as a technical entity, while the standard for
regulation of content is much higher.
The opposite conclusion is reached by Roger Pilon, Senior Fellow
and Director, Center for Constitutional Studies at the Cato Institute.
Pilon views the Court's fundamental flaw to be its basic method of
constitutional analysis-the application of a multilevel system of scru-
tiny. "[T]he chances of a law being found constitutional are almost a
direct function of the level of judicial scrutiny the law receives-
'strict,' 'intermediate,' 'relaxed,' or 'minimal'." Such "scrutiny the-
11. Id. at 2469.
12. Id. at 2472.
13. Id. at 2468, 2470-72.
14. Id. at 2468.
15. Id. at 2479 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
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ory," Pilon argues, has no basis in the original design of the
Constitution.
A third position-must-carry, but for public broadcasters only-
is advanced by Donald Hawthorne and Monroe Price of the Cardozo
School of Law. They believe that a must~carry requirement for com-
mercial broadcasters is constitutionally invalid because there is no
meaningful content basis to give them preferential access to cable
over their competitors. On the other hand, the authors argue for the
constitutionality of mandated access of non-commercial stations, be-
cause their content and status meets congressional objectives.
Another question raised by the 1992 Cable Act is whether the
owners of one medium can be precluded from controlling another.
The 1992 Cable Act bars a cable operator from owning alternative
video delivery systems (such as satellite master antenna systems or
microwave "wireless cable") in the same franchise area. Edwin
Baker, Professor of Law at the University of Pennsylvania Law
School, addresses the cross-ownership rule and its First Amendment
basis. He argues in favor of structural regulation to establish a diver-
sity of information from antagonistic sources. To him, a telephone-
cable merger would create an undesirable monopoly with market and
political power.
In a similar vein, Professor Cass Sunstein of the Chicago Law
School argues against First Amendment absolutism: "What seems to
be government regulation of speech might, in some circumstances,
promote free speech ...what seems to be free speech in markets
might, on reflection, amount to an abridgement of free speech." A
communication distribution network, where it is a natural monopoly,
could be regulated as a common carrier. To support this position,
Sunstein presents a provocative paradigm that he calls a "New Deal
for Speech." He reasons that when the government grants exclusive
property rights in the form of licensing broadcasters, for example, a
broadcaster becomes an agent of the government. The broadcaster's
subsequent act of denying access to a programmer becomes, by associ-
ation, a governmental act. Therefore, the speaker (programmer) can
seek First Amendment protection against the restriction of its speech.
Sunstein suggests that a strict reading of the First Amendment permits
government to grant exclusive ownership rights to communication
networks only with the condition of common carriage.
Looking at the issue of a cable operator's liability for indecent
programming over its leased and public access channels, Professor
Fred Schauer of the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard takes
first issue with the frequent assertion that rights entail responsibilities.
1994]
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He finds the cable operators' lost immunity to be largely symbolic in
nature because media producers and conduits have historically been
largely protected from liability for indecent, defamatory, and mislead-
ing programming. He points to the more important issue associated
with a shifting of the cable industry's role in leased channels from that
of a passive quasi-common carrier to one with editorial control over
leased and public access channels. Schauer has a word of caution to
the cable industry as it follows the editorial model of control over in-
decent programming. He suggests that a more advantageous position
for the cable industry would be to follow the telephone model by de-
fining itself as a common carrier of leased and public access channels.
Establishing the basic principles of cable regulation is one thing;
implementing them is quite another. From a constitutional perspec-
tive, how did the FCC put Congress' mandates into effect? While this
is an ongoing process, some early conclusions are possible. Professor
Michael Meyerson of the University of Baltimore School of Law looks
at the FCC's handling of indecent programming and home-shopping
on cable. He finds that the FCC's holding the indecency restrictions
constitutionally valid while discounting earlier court cases was without
merit and misleading. "The FCC's analysis ... reveals such an over-
eagerness to restrict constitutionally protected speech as to call into
question the degree to which the Commission was sympathetic to the
constitutional concerns its rules raised." But he is also sympathetic to
the FCC's dilemma: "As a creature of Congress, an agency is prohib-
ited from second-guessing its creator. It is Dr. Frankenstein, not his
monster, who gets the last word."
Congress, deeply distrustful of the deregulation-minded FCC of
the Reagan and Bush years, left the FCC with little discretion. For
example, in the absence of "effective competition," the 1992 Cable
Act required the FCC to develop a methodology, under a tight dead-
line, to regulate rates for basic cable service. As it turns out, a Demo-
cratic FCC was soon at work, creating "benchmarks" against which
actual price increases were measured. How well did the FCC do its
job? The case of benchmarks is one instance in which the FCC's im-
plementation of the 1992 Cable Act can be subjected to a quantitative
analysis. Stanley Besen, author of the FCC's major 1980 Network In-
quiry Study,16 and John Woodbury, both of Charles River Associates,
analyze the FCC's statistical methodology to estimate the benchmark
rates-first determined at ten percent, and then, with a new chairman
16. FCC, NETWORK INQUIRY SPECIAL STAFF, NEW TELEVISION NETWORKS: ENTRY,
JURISDICTION, OWNERSHIP AND REGULATION (1980).
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and new methodology, seventeen percent-and conclude that it was
seriously flawed.17
One of the most sensitive free speech issues is the right not to
speak. In the cable context, it is the right of owners of a program to
use it as they see fit. Yet the 1992 Cable Act includes a "must-license"
requirement according to which a cable-affiliated program provider
must make its programs available to other multichannel program dis-
tributors under non-discriminatory terms. Professor Wendy Gordon
and Anne Gowen of Boston University School of Law analyze this
issue. They conclude that while those limitations on vendors' prop-
erty rights may be questioned, they are in line with current practice in
statutory intellectual property law as well as in judge-made tort and
property law.
Many of these themes are picked up in a central symposium arti-
cle by Robert Corn-Revere, of Hogan & Hartson, and a former legal
assistant to long-time FCC Commissioner James Quello, who served
as Acting Chairman during several of the FCC's 1992 Cable Act im-
plementation proceedings. Corn-Revere traces the evolution of
speech regulation in various media and describes how we are on the
verge of a major shift in First Amendment doctrine in the emerging
Multimedia Age. This has legislators, regulators, and courts in a box
as they try to maintain the three regulatory models of print, tele-
phone, and broadcast in an environment of converging technology.
He argues for a return to the core values of the First Amendment,
which he calls the "traditionalist perspective." The traditionalist ap-
proach assumes that different media may use a variety of technologi-
cal means of distribution, but it treats these and other distinguishing
characteristics as tools of analysis, not as catalysts for a separate con-
stitutional standard.
III
Common Carriage as a Free Speech Remedy?
The authors provide fascinating reading. Some of them clearly
know more about constitutional law than about cable television, but
even that distance can be helpful to those too close to the subject mat-
ter of media. Their conclusions are varied. Some, like Sunstein, advo-
cate considerable regulation in order to protect diverse speech and
other values. Others, like Corn-Revere, view that approach as pre-
cisely the problem. No summary can synthesize these divergent per-
17. Part of their analysis was originally developed on behalf of the cable firm Tele-
Com'munications Inc. (TCI) for submission to the FCC.
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spectives without overgeneralizing or trivializing. One issue, however,
merits additional discussion-common carriage. It is advocated by
several of the authors as the solution to assure free speech. Yet their
recommendations on the exact nature of such common carriage re-
main vague, more in the nature of handwaving than of legal or policy
analysis. Given the weight of the common carriage position, at least
in the intellectual community, though less in Washington, D.C., it mer-
its further discussion.
Precursors to common carriage go back to the Roman Empire
and to the legal obligations of shipowners, innkeepers, and stable-
keepers. In England, early common law placed certain duties on busi-
nesses which were considered "public callings." Common or public
occupations included those of bakers, brewers, cab drivers, ferrymen,
innkeepers, millers, smiths, surgeons, tailors, and wharfingers. 18
"Common" in that context meant "open to serving the general
public."
The concept of common carriage crossed the Atlantic and be-
came part of the American legal system. Common carriage was
broadly applied to railroads and later other transportation as well as
telecommunications media. In 1901 the Supreme Court held that at
common law-i.e., even without a specific statute-a telegraph com-
pany is a common carrier and owes a duty of non-discrimination. 19
Broadcasters (with the brief exception of an AT&T proposal in
the 1920s to serve as a general broadcast service provider under a
common carriage obligation) were never common carriers. Cable
television, too, was never treated as a common carrier, being viewed
at first as essentially a passive antenna system. Cable television com-
panies, in providing most of their traditional services, are not consid-
ered common carriers.20 The 1992 Cable Act did not change that,
though "must-carry" requirements for over-the-air broadcasters, as
well as public and leased channels, created some access rights.
In the early 1970s, the White House's new Office of Telecommu-
nications Policy proposed a common carrier status; however, the idea
never got very far. More recently, regulatory proceedings into the na-
ture of common carriage for video services were undertaken by the
New York Public Service Commission,21 and by the Federal Commu-
18. See CHARLES PHILLIPS, JR., THE REGULATION OF PUBLIC UTILITIES: THEORY
AND PRACTICE 83 (2d ed. 1984).
19. Western Union Tel. Co. v. Call Publishing Co., 181 U.S. 92, 98 (1901).
20. 47 U.S.C. § 541(d) (1984).
21. New York State Public Service Commission, Opinion and Order Adopting Regula-
tions Concerning Common Carriage, No. 89-C-099 (1990). Proceedings initiated by one of
the authors when he served as a Public Service Commissioner for New York State.
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nications Commission proceeding on video dialtone.22 Recent legisla-
tive initiatives23 as well as the Clinton Administration's proposal of a
new regulatory category for switched interactive digital broadband
(Title VII)24 have pursued the common carrier theme.
In 1994, the Clinton Administration proposed the enactment of a
new regulatory category (Title VII of the 1934 Communications Act)
under which providers of switched interactive digital broadband serv-
ices could elect to be regulated under a new system rather than the
old.25 This new system would require interconnection, universal ser-
vice, payments to local governments, and "open access," a term not
specified other than that it would apply to "anyone, including end
users and information service providers to transmit information, in-
cluding voice, data, and video programming, on a non-discriminatory
basis."26 It comes close to common carriage, without using the term.
Yet all these policy proceedings are conducted in a partial-equi-
librium setting. They fail to take fully into account the system-wide
dynamics of interaction, in this case between common carriers and
contract carriers. Those authors in this symposium advocating com-
mon carriage fall into the same trap of not recognizing the impact of
competition on common carriage.
The institution of common carriage, historically the foundation of
the way telecommunications are delivered, will not survive in the long
term. To clarify, "common carriers" (the misnomer often used to re-
fer to telephone companies) will continue to exist, but the status
under which they operate-offering service on a non-discriminatory
basis, neutral as to use and user-will not.27
This conclusion is reached reluctantly. Common carriage, after
all, is of substantial social value. It extends free speech principles to
privately-owned carriers. It is an arrangement that promotes diver-
sity of content services, reduces market forces, promotes interconnec-
22. In re Telephone Company-Cable Television Cross-Ownership Rules, Second Re-
port and Order, Recommendation to Congress, and Second Further Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking in CC Docket No. 87-266, 7 FCC Rcd. 5781 (1992).
23. National Communications Competition and Information Infrastructure Act of 1993:
Hearings on H.R. 3636 Before the Subcomm. on 'Telecommunications and Finance of the
House of Representatives Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993); S.
REP. No. 1086, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993); S. REP. No. 1822, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (1994).
24. Clinton Administration White Paper on Communications Act Reform 5 (issued
Jan. 27, 1994), reprinted in 18 DAILY REP. FOR EXECUTIVES (BNA), at M1 (Jan. 28, 1994).
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. For details of the analysis, see Eli Noam, Beyond Liberalization II: The Impending
Doom of Common Carriage, TELECOMMUNICATIONS POLICY, Aug. 1994, at 435.
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tion, encourages competition, assists the universality of infrastructure
services, reduces transaction cost, and limits liability.
Following the late Ithiel de Sola Pool, the noted MIT political
scientist of media, it is often observed that telephone companies oper-
ate on common carriage, private publishers follow free speech princi-
ples, and broadcasters and cable companies operate on some not
entirely free basis since they are licensed and regulated.28 But what
happens when the walls separating these realms crumble?
The problem for common carriage is not other competing com-
mon carriers but private contract carriers without the need to serve
everybody on equal terms. In head-to-head competition between a
common carrier and a private contract carrier, the former is at an in-
herent disadvantage. The reasons are as follows:
" A common carrier cannot use differentiated pricing in the same
way that a private contract carrier can, due to its non-discrimina-
tion obligation and because it cannot prevent arbitrage;
" A common carrier must provide service to a contract carrier, but
not vice-versa. It must provide its competition with its own low-
cost segments, but has no access to those of a rival;
" A contract carrier can pick customers and avoid high-risk
customers;
" A contract carrier can manage the competition among its custom-
ers and benefit from it.
The conclusion is, therefore, that a contract carrier will be eco-
nomically more profitable than a common carrier, essentially because
it has more flexibility in setting pricing, service conditions, and choice
of customer.
It is not likely that the common carriers will simply sit by as their
competitors prevail. They will also make a differentiation according
to customers, partly based on the argument of "meeting competition."
The de-averaging of prices would become standard, and negotiated
rates would spread. Any non-trivial differentiation means that some
potential users or uses can be excluded.
The Clinton Administration's 1994 proposal of Title VII regula-
tion was mindful of the asymmetry in regulation between common
and private carriers and of the importance of common carriage's open
access. It proposed a unified treatment for new switched interactive
digital broadband services, but the voluntary nature of this regulation
makes this approach meaningless. Contract carriers are unlikely to
28. ITHIEL DE SOLA POOL, TECHNOLOGIES OF FREEDOM (1983). See also ITHIEL DE
SOLA POOL, TECHNOLOGIES WITHOUT BOUNDARIES (Eli Noam ed., 1990).
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assume voluntarily the obligations of open access, plus universal ser-
vice, mandatory interconnection, and local franchise fees.
Could the problem of common carriage's instability under com-
petition be resolved by making everyone a common carrier? That
would eliminate any competitive disadvantage .relative to private car-
riage. It would also radically transform all media, because where
would one draw the line? Wherever it is, those inside it would be at a
disadvantage to those outside. To be consistent, one would have to
include broadcasters, private telephone networks, and even enhanced
services! It is incorrect to believe-as many do-that one could sim-
ply limit common carriage to the transmission conduit and separate it
from "upper level" services. The same pressure of private carriage, in
a competitive market, would emerge through resale of transmission
service and through systems integration. Their advantage is that,
given competition, they pay to transmission carriers a price based only
on the latter's short-term marginal costs and can pass this low cost on
to their customers. As a result of these advantages, resellers and inte-
grators may well emerge in the future as service providers superior to
common carriers themselves, even though they use the latter's under-
lying transmission facilities.
Where two principles-common carriage and private contract
carriage-are fundamentally in conflict, it is natural to seek some rec-
onciliation. But what can that be? There are several possibilities for a
hybrid system. None of them is likely to work for long. We have al-
ready shown that if some competitors are common carriers while
others are contract carriers, common carriage would lose out. An-
other possibility would be to have an "internal hybridization" within
carriers themselves. Here, too, the advantages to a firm that resorts to
contract carriage will continue to assert themselves, and thus will
invariably lead to a process of "creeping self-privatization."29
The conclusion of the analysis is that common carriage will erode
in time and that a hybrid co-existence will not be stable. This is not to
say that the common carriers qua carriers will become extinct; many
of them will remain significant players, but they will conduct their
business as contract carriers. Common carriage as such will disappear.
This will not happen overnight, of course. Intermediate arrangements
29. Still another approach would be common carrier rights of way. A contract carrer
would not have to operate as a common carrier, but if it chose to interconnect with or
access other networks by taking advantage of common carrier access rights, then it would
be required to offer such rights reciprocally on part of its capacity upstream. This system
ensures a coexistence of common and private carriage in a static but not dynamic world.
Eli Noam, The Superstructure of Infrastructure: Principles for a Future Without a Public
Network, 13 COMMUNICATIONS & STRATEGIES 109 (1994).
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can buy several decades of transition time. The basic dynamics, how-
ever, will eventually assert themselves.
If common carriage is on its way out, what are the implications?
In most areas where common carriage is held to be important, market
competition would serve as well-in the reduction of market power,
promotion of infrastructure, and limited liability. On the other hand,
competition is less likely to result in optimal solutions in interconnec-
tion and free speech access. A diverse carrier system would have
room for a large number of voices. However, the diversity of such
voices might be narrower, because private carriers might not want to
be identified with certain types of uses and users. Competition will
not necessarily resolve this problem since all carriers will be under
similar pressures. Take as an example birth control information by a
hotline of an abortion clinic. Faced with negative publicity and pres-
sure, service providers with discretion in the choice of customer may
drop the service as a business decision. It is, of course, likely that
"alternative" carriers and systems integrators will emerge to serve
such uses. Yet this solves only part of the problem. The need for the
various systems to access each other, and for information to travel
over numerous interconnected carriers, means that the content restric-
tiveness of any one of the participants would require everyone else to
institute content and usage tests before they can hand over or accept
traffic, or they must agree to the most restrictive principles. Informa-
tion travels across numerous subnetworks until it reaches its destina-
tion, and one cannot easily tell one bit apart from another bit. If each
of these networks and systems integrators sets its own rules about
which information is carried and which is not, information would not
flow easily or cheaply.
The juxtaposition of positive and negatives may give the impres-
sion that a policy choice exists. But as has been argued above, once
the basic choice has been made, correctly and unavoidably, in favor of
competitive and non-compartmentalized transmission media and up-
per level services, the eventual unravelling of common carriage is also
inevitable.
This suggests that new policy instruments will have to be found to
deal with the negative effect on information diversity and flow. One
way to do so is by replacing the principle of common carriage with a
new principle, that of third-party neutral interconnection. A carrier
can elect to be private by running its own self-contained infrastructure
and having full control over its content, use, and access. But if it inter-
connects into other networks and accepts transmission traffic from
them, it cannot pick some bits over other bits. While a private carrier
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can be selective in its direct customers, whether they are end-users or
content providers, it cannot selectively transmit traffic passed on to it
by another interconnected carrier by the latter's own customers, based
on content, uses, or usage. This does not require interconnection or
transmission on equal terms, as in the case of common carriage, but it
establishes the possibility of arbitrage if differentiated pricing occurs.
All of common carriage's goals of free-flow, low transaction cost, and
no liability goals can thus be preserved, within a competitive system.
This new system, and others that will no doubt be proposed, is
part of the deregulatory and post-deregulatory agenda. Nostalgia for
the tools appropriate to a past media system is no substitute. When
the 1992 Cable Act will be reformed-as it inevitably will be-it is
necessary to have alternative constructs. One must measure them
with a fundamental yardstick, freedom of expression.

